When the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) investigated MediaMarkt, Teknosa, and Vatan, the question wasn’t simply whether prices looked alike — it was whether those similarities meant coordination. To test that, in the decision dated (26.10.2023 and numbered 23-50/978-355) the Economic Analysis and Research Department (EAAD) was asked to take a hard look at the data.

EAAD’s role was to find out whether the price movements observed in the market reflected deliberate alignment or natural interaction in a concentrated, transparent retail environment. Its report became the most data-driven part of the file — and a model of how competition authorities use empirical work to inform enforcement.

How EAAD did it

EAAD conducted an extensive quantitative study, which it submitted to the file on 24 April 2023 (no. 63296). The analysis combined market data from both online channels (the retailers’ official websites) and physical stores located in shopping malls (AVMs), covering a broad enough range to capture real-world pricing behavior.

The scope was focused but representative:

  • 10 products tracked online.
  • 5 products observed across 10 shopping malls.

For products where preliminary findings suggested unusual synchronization, EAAD performed a deeper, hourly-based analysis using average prices across undertakings. This micro-level approach allowed the team to see not only if prices aligned, but how — and under what timing pattern.

The hourly data revealed a nuanced picture. Prices occasionally equalized, but the equalizations went in both directions — sometimes through price cuts, sometimes through price increases. There was no single trend and no leader–follower dynamic: no retailer systematically set prices first or dictated changes for others.

In some cases, two firms might raise prices while the third reduced them. At other times, one retailer kept its price stable while others changed theirs. These variations showed that pricing strategies were independent and responsive, not coordinated.

When EAAD compared price-change frequencies and timing patterns within a 60-day window, it found that the retailers usually adjusted prices at different hours or on different days. The number of changes and timing of updates also varied by firm — particularly with Vatan, which displayed noticeably distinct pricing behavior compared with MediaMarkt and Teknosa.

To understand what might explain those timing differences, the Authority followed up with the companies. Each was asked whether the “risk periods” identified in the analysis — those moments when prices aligned — were linked to any specific factors like promotions, campaign starts or ends, seasonal discounts, cost changes, or supply shortages.

In their responses, Vatan, Teknosa, and MediaMarkt all pointed to commercially rational explanations: campaign schedules, supplier costs, and independent marketing decisions. None acknowledged any mutual coordination, and the Authority found nothing to contradict that account.

EAAD then integrated this information into its assessment. While it acknowledged that, in some periods, the market data could resemble those seen in restricted-competition environments, it stressed that this resemblance was not supported by evidence of collusion. The combination of hourly pricing data and firms’ explanations for promotions or supply shocks made it clear that the patterns could not be tied to any anticompetitive understanding.

What EAAD actually found

Pulling all this together, EAAD concluded that:

  • Prices occasionally moved in parallel, but both upward and downward, showing no single trend.
  • There was no leader–follower structure among the three undertakings.
  • Each firm displayed distinct timing in its price changes, with Vatan often behaving differently.
  • Price alignments tended to occur at different hours or days, suggesting reaction rather than coordination.
  • Once campaign effects and supply-side factors were accounted for, no collusive pattern remained.

What paragraph 93 revealed

The Board summarized EAAD’s findings and the legal standard in paragraph 93:

“The analysis indicates that during some periods, prices followed parallel paths and that market conditions similar to those observed in restricted-competition markets existed. However, given the market’s oligopolistic structure, it is necessary to distinguish whether such price movements stem from an anticompetitive agreement, from firms monitoring each other through publicly available information, or from other factors affecting prices. In the Board’s practice, price parallelism detected solely through economic evidence does not, by itself, amount to an infringement under Law No. 4054 unless supported by communication evidence. In this case, no document indicating that the undertakings communicated or exchanged information has been found.”

That sentence crystalizes the heart of the matter: economic parallelism is not enough. Without communication evidence, similar prices remain consistent with legitimate competitive observation in an oligopolistic market.

How that fed into the Board’s call

The Competition Board adopted EAAD’s balanced view. Within the evidence tested, it found no documents or communications demonstrating an infringement of Article 4 by MediaMarkt, Teknosa, or Vatan. Consequently, no fines were imposed.

EAAD’s nuanced portrait — occasional parallel movements, dynamic and competitive pricing, no leader–follower pattern, some “restricted-competition-like” conditions but no collusion proof — provided the analytical backbone of that outcome.

Why it matters

The case is a textbook example of how economic analysis can cool legal suspicion. In markets dominated by a few visible players, data can look suspiciously coordinated even when it’s just interdependent competition.

EAAD’s methodical, data-driven work helped the TCA avoid confusing market structure with concerted practice. It reaffirmed a core antitrust principle that matters everywhere from Brussels to Ankara:

Parallel ≠ collusion.

Economic evidence can show resemblance, but without communication, it doesn’t prove conspiracy — and that distinction keeps enforcement both fair and credible.

This post was written with analytical and editorial support from ChatGPT-5, using official sources from the Turkish Competition Authority’s decision (dated 26.10.2023 and numbered 23-50/978-355). All interpretations, however, reflect the author’s own understanding of the case and the role of economic analysis in competition enforcement.