In October 2023, the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) issued one of its analytically intriguing decisions of recent years — the yeast market investigation involving Mauri Maya A.Ş., Lesaffre Turquie, Pak Gıda (Pakmaya), and Dosu Maya. (Decision dated 17.08.2023 and numbered 23-39/755-264).
The case revolved around allegations that these producers and distributors had coordinated prices and shared markets in the sale of fresh yeast throughout Turkey.
Well, yeast investigations are not the news in the Turkish antitrust history1. However, this one stands out due to the economics involved.
Who is Mauri Maya?
Mauri Maya A.Ş. is the Turkish subsidiary of AB Mauri, part of the Associated British Foods (ABF) group — a UK-based multinational that operates in more than 30 countries and is among the world’s leading yeast and bakery ingredient suppliers.
In Turkey, Mauri Maya is a technologically advanced producer and a long-standing competitor to Pakmaya and Lesaffre, both established brands with nationwide distribution networks. The company operates in a concentrated market that has always been under close watch by the TCA for potential coordination risks.
A different kind of defense: economics in Bilkent
When the investigation reached Bilkent, where the Competition Authority’s headquarters are located, most companies relied on procedural or communication-based arguments.
Mauri Maya chose a different route — one that drew attention among competition professionals.
It commissioned a detailed Economic Analysis Report — an ambitious and data-heavy defense built on industrial organization theory and econometrics. Rather than simply denying the allegations, Mauri tried to prove its competitive conduct through numbers.
That choice was unusual and, in many ways, admirable. In a legal landscape where competition cases are often fought with correspondence and witness statements, Mauri Maya’s reliance on formal economic reasoning stood out as a sophisticated and forward-looking strategy.
Mauri Maya’s economic arguments
In its report, the company presented a multi-layered economic case:
- Double-marginalization logic: Mauri argued that even if a downstream (distributor-level) cartel existed, it would make little sense for an upstream producer like itself to join it. Doing so would trigger a double mark-up problem — two monopoly layers, reducing joint profits rather than raising them.
- Prices follow costs: The company provided data showing that its net prices were closely tied to average production costs, indicating that its pricing behavior was driven by input changes, not coordination.
- Econometric validation: Through cointegration and Granger-causality tests, Mauri attempted to demonstrate that prices and costs moved together over time — consistent with competitive dynamics rather than collusive independence.
- Right of defense: Mauri complained that the Investigation Committee had ignored its Economic Analysis Report altogether, claiming a violation of its right to defense by failing to discuss its empirical findings.
In short, Mauri didn’t just say “we didn’t collude” — it said, “our data shows we competed.”
The TCA’s and EAAD’s evaluation
Recognizing the report’s technical depth, the Board requested an expert opinion from its Economic Analysis and Research Department (EAAD). EAAD reviewed Mauri’s report and provided a detailed critique:
- The claim that an upstream firm could never join a downstream cartel was considered theoretically incomplete. EAAD noted that while double marginalization can reduce profits in simple models, real markets can feature shared incentives or coordination mechanisms that make such behavior rational.
- Under the Cournot model Mauri used, the predicted output reduction was far greater than theoretical expectations, leading to implausible profit effects.
- The cointegration analysis showing a stable relationship between prices and costs did not demonstrate the absence of collusion. EAAD emphasized that such a link is expected in virtually all markets — the key question is how that relationship changes over time, not whether it exists.
- The Granger-causality test, meant to show that costs drive prices, was described as limited in probative value — it can reveal the direction of influence but not its strength.
EAAD’s overall assessment was polite but clear: the report was methodologically interesting, yet insufficient to disprove the existence of coordinated behavior.
The Board’s decision
After considering EAAD’s opinion and the broader evidence, the Competition Board concluded that Mauri Maya had participated in anticompetitive coordination within the Turkish yeast market.
While the Board acknowledged the sophistication of Mauri Maya’s defense and its contribution to the analytical quality of the case, it ultimately found that the report did not overturn the factual and behavioral evidence indicating concerted practices.
As a result, Mauri Maya was found to have infringed Article 4 of Law No. 4054 and was fined, alongside other market participants.
Why this case matters
The Mauri Maya case stands out not for its outcome, but for its method. It showed that even in Bilkent, where most competition law battles are fought on procedural and evidentiary grounds, a company can choose to defend itself through economics — with models, data, and theory.
Although Mauri’s analysis did not change the final ruling, it raised the intellectual bar for future cases. It demonstrated that economic evidence is not just a technical appendix — it can be the language of defense itself.
And perhaps most importantly, it reminded everyone watching from Bilkent that competition law, at its best, is a field where law meets economics, and data meets judgment.
Author’s Note:
This article was prepared with analytical and editorial support from ChatGPT-5, based on the Turkish Competition Authority’s official decision (5 October 2023, No. 23-44/841-300). Interpretations and emphasis reflect the author’s own reading of the case and the evolving role of economic evidence in Bilkent’s competition practice.
- Past TCA Decisions on the Fresh Yeast Market (Snapshot)
Investigation (Soruşturma) Decisions
– 27.06.2000 – Decision 00-24/255-138
Allegations: price fixing and regional market sharing among Pak Maya, Öz Maya, Saf Maya, Ak Maya, Mauri Maya.
Findings: insufficient evidence of joint list-price setting or regional sharing; but dealers’ competition was restrained through concerted practices at the dealer level → Article 4 infringement; fines imposed.
Litigation: initial court rejections later overturned due to a procedural issue (a case-handling Board member voting in the final decision); on 12.11.2008 (08-63/1051-410) the Board re-decided and again fined Pak Maya, Öz Maya, Saf Maya.
–23.09.2005 – Decision 05-60/896-241
Allegation: price agreement among Pak Maya, Öz Maya, Mauri Maya, Ak Maya (Feb–Nov 2003) with high, synchronized price hikes.
Decision: concerted practice (Art. 4) → fines.
Litigation: for three parties (not Mauri), the Board’s decision was annulled over the wrong turnover year used for the fine; on 12.11.2008 (08-63/1050-409) the Board re-issued a decision and re-fined parties; subsequent suits were rejected. For Mauri, the suit was rejected because the turnover used was actually lower than it should have been (so no prejudice).
–22.10.2014 – Decision 14-42/783-346
Allegation: agreement to raise fresh yeast prices by Dosu, Mauri, Öz Maya, Pak Maya.
Decision: Art. 4 infringement; no individual exemption; fines for Dosu, Öz, Pak.
Mauri: received no fine due to Leniency/Active Cooperation accepted earlier (13-40/515-MP).
Litigation: multiple lawsuits; final judgments upheld the Board’s decision (most parts).
Preliminary Inquiry (Önaraştırma) Decisions
–05.03.2009 – 09-09/181-53: Alleged joint pricing for fresh yeast by Pak, Öz, Mauri, Ak.
→ Price increases largely aligned with cost increases; no evidence supporting collusion → no investigation.
–26.08.2010 – 10-56/1106-423: Alleged discriminatory pricing between Şanlıurfa city center and Siverek.
→ Insufficient supporting information; no pricing infringement → no investigation.
–08.11.2018 – 18-42/664-325: Alleged monopolization/high prices in supply and impression of customer allocation.
→ No evidence of joint pricing or customer sharing by producers/dealers → no investigation.
Merger/Acquisition (Birleşme/Devralma) Decisions:
–Dosu Maya / Lesaffre
2014 (process initiated) → 15.12.2014 – Decision 14-52/903-411
Lesaffre to acquire full control of Dosu Maya (from Yıldız Holding).
Concerns under Art. 7; remedies required (per 2010/4 Communiqué & Remedies Guideline).
Conditional clearance with Lesaffre’s commitments (e.g., divest 2000 Gıda distributor, maintain separate brands & distribution, remove exclusivities, compliance program, price-cap commitments on Öz Maya/Dosu brands, no acquisition of Ak Maya assets).
Court annulment (2017) → case re-assessed.
–31.05.2018 – Decision 18-17/316-156
Conditional approval reaffirmed with an updated commitment package and duration extensions (e.g., extend non-integration in distribution, maintain brand/price differentials, protect/expand Dosu distribution coverage, remove exclusivities for 3 years, extend compliance, extend price-cap commitments, no Ak Maya acquisition, and a no-imports commitment for 3 years).
Ongoing monitoring reports submitted (2015–2021) showed compliance. ↩︎