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(CASE: Türkiye) When Economics Enters Bilkent: The Mauri Maya Case Before the Turkish Competition Authority
In October 2023, the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) issued one of its analytically intriguing decisions of recent years — the yeast market investigation involving Mauri Maya A.Ş., Lesaffre Turquie, Pak Gıda (Pakmaya), and Dosu Maya. (Decision dated 17.08.2023 and numbered 23-39/755-264).
The case revolved around allegations that these producers and distributors had coordinated prices and shared markets in the sale of fresh yeast throughout Turkey.Well, yeast investigations are not the news in the Turkish antitrust history1. However, this one stands out due to the economics involved.
Who is Mauri Maya?
Mauri Maya A.Ş. is the Turkish subsidiary of AB Mauri, part of the Associated British Foods (ABF) group — a UK-based multinational that operates in more than 30 countries and is among the world’s leading yeast and bakery ingredient suppliers.
In Turkey, Mauri Maya is a technologically advanced producer and a long-standing competitor to Pakmaya and Lesaffre, both established brands with nationwide distribution networks. The company operates in a concentrated market that has always been under close watch by the TCA for potential coordination risks.
A different kind of defense: economics in Bilkent
When the investigation reached Bilkent, where the Competition Authority’s headquarters are located, most companies relied on procedural or communication-based arguments.
Mauri Maya chose a different route — one that drew attention among competition professionals.It commissioned a detailed Economic Analysis Report — an ambitious and data-heavy defense built on industrial organization theory and econometrics. Rather than simply denying the allegations, Mauri tried to prove its competitive conduct through numbers.
That choice was unusual and, in many ways, admirable. In a legal landscape where competition cases are often fought with correspondence and witness statements, Mauri Maya’s reliance on formal economic reasoning stood out as a sophisticated and forward-looking strategy.
Mauri Maya’s economic arguments
In its report, the company presented a multi-layered economic case:
- Double-marginalization logic: Mauri argued that even if a downstream (distributor-level) cartel existed, it would make little sense for an upstream producer like itself to join it. Doing so would trigger a double mark-up problem — two monopoly layers, reducing joint profits rather than raising them.
- Prices follow costs: The company provided data showing that its net prices were closely tied to average production costs, indicating that its pricing behavior was driven by input changes, not coordination.
- Econometric validation: Through cointegration and Granger-causality tests, Mauri attempted to demonstrate that prices and costs moved together over time — consistent with competitive dynamics rather than collusive independence.
- Right of defense: Mauri complained that the Investigation Committee had ignored its Economic Analysis Report altogether, claiming a violation of its right to defense by failing to discuss its empirical findings.
In short, Mauri didn’t just say “we didn’t collude” — it said, “our data shows we competed.”
The TCA’s and EAAD’s evaluation
Recognizing the report’s technical depth, the Board requested an expert opinion from its Economic Analysis and Research Department (EAAD). EAAD reviewed Mauri’s report and provided a detailed critique:
- The claim that an upstream firm could never join a downstream cartel was considered theoretically incomplete. EAAD noted that while double marginalization can reduce profits in simple models, real markets can feature shared incentives or coordination mechanisms that make such behavior rational.
- Under the Cournot model Mauri used, the predicted output reduction was far greater than theoretical expectations, leading to implausible profit effects.
- The cointegration analysis showing a stable relationship between prices and costs did not demonstrate the absence of collusion. EAAD emphasized that such a link is expected in virtually all markets — the key question is how that relationship changes over time, not whether it exists.
- The Granger-causality test, meant to show that costs drive prices, was described as limited in probative value — it can reveal the direction of influence but not its strength.
EAAD’s overall assessment was polite but clear: the report was methodologically interesting, yet insufficient to disprove the existence of coordinated behavior.
The Board’s decision
After considering EAAD’s opinion and the broader evidence, the Competition Board concluded that Mauri Maya had participated in anticompetitive coordination within the Turkish yeast market.
While the Board acknowledged the sophistication of Mauri Maya’s defense and its contribution to the analytical quality of the case, it ultimately found that the report did not overturn the factual and behavioral evidence indicating concerted practices.As a result, Mauri Maya was found to have infringed Article 4 of Law No. 4054 and was fined, alongside other market participants.
Why this case matters
The Mauri Maya case stands out not for its outcome, but for its method. It showed that even in Bilkent, where most competition law battles are fought on procedural and evidentiary grounds, a company can choose to defend itself through economics — with models, data, and theory.
Although Mauri’s analysis did not change the final ruling, it raised the intellectual bar for future cases. It demonstrated that economic evidence is not just a technical appendix — it can be the language of defense itself.
And perhaps most importantly, it reminded everyone watching from Bilkent that competition law, at its best, is a field where law meets economics, and data meets judgment.
Author’s Note:
This article was prepared with analytical and editorial support from ChatGPT-5, based on the Turkish Competition Authority’s official decision (5 October 2023, No. 23-44/841-300). Interpretations and emphasis reflect the author’s own reading of the case and the evolving role of economic evidence in Bilkent’s competition practice.
- Past TCA Decisions on the Fresh Yeast Market (Snapshot)
Investigation (Soruşturma) Decisions
– 27.06.2000 – Decision 00-24/255-138
Allegations: price fixing and regional market sharing among Pak Maya, Öz Maya, Saf Maya, Ak Maya, Mauri Maya.
Findings: insufficient evidence of joint list-price setting or regional sharing; but dealers’ competition was restrained through concerted practices at the dealer level → Article 4 infringement; fines imposed.
Litigation: initial court rejections later overturned due to a procedural issue (a case-handling Board member voting in the final decision); on 12.11.2008 (08-63/1051-410) the Board re-decided and again fined Pak Maya, Öz Maya, Saf Maya.
–23.09.2005 – Decision 05-60/896-241
Allegation: price agreement among Pak Maya, Öz Maya, Mauri Maya, Ak Maya (Feb–Nov 2003) with high, synchronized price hikes.
Decision: concerted practice (Art. 4) → fines.
Litigation: for three parties (not Mauri), the Board’s decision was annulled over the wrong turnover year used for the fine; on 12.11.2008 (08-63/1050-409) the Board re-issued a decision and re-fined parties; subsequent suits were rejected. For Mauri, the suit was rejected because the turnover used was actually lower than it should have been (so no prejudice).
–22.10.2014 – Decision 14-42/783-346
Allegation: agreement to raise fresh yeast prices by Dosu, Mauri, Öz Maya, Pak Maya.
Decision: Art. 4 infringement; no individual exemption; fines for Dosu, Öz, Pak.
Mauri: received no fine due to Leniency/Active Cooperation accepted earlier (13-40/515-MP).
Litigation: multiple lawsuits; final judgments upheld the Board’s decision (most parts).
Preliminary Inquiry (Önaraştırma) Decisions
–05.03.2009 – 09-09/181-53: Alleged joint pricing for fresh yeast by Pak, Öz, Mauri, Ak.
→ Price increases largely aligned with cost increases; no evidence supporting collusion → no investigation.
–26.08.2010 – 10-56/1106-423: Alleged discriminatory pricing between Şanlıurfa city center and Siverek.
→ Insufficient supporting information; no pricing infringement → no investigation.
–08.11.2018 – 18-42/664-325: Alleged monopolization/high prices in supply and impression of customer allocation.
→ No evidence of joint pricing or customer sharing by producers/dealers → no investigation.
Merger/Acquisition (Birleşme/Devralma) Decisions:
–Dosu Maya / Lesaffre
2014 (process initiated) → 15.12.2014 – Decision 14-52/903-411
Lesaffre to acquire full control of Dosu Maya (from Yıldız Holding).
Concerns under Art. 7; remedies required (per 2010/4 Communiqué & Remedies Guideline).
Conditional clearance with Lesaffre’s commitments (e.g., divest 2000 Gıda distributor, maintain separate brands & distribution, remove exclusivities, compliance program, price-cap commitments on Öz Maya/Dosu brands, no acquisition of Ak Maya assets).
Court annulment (2017) → case re-assessed.
–31.05.2018 – Decision 18-17/316-156
Conditional approval reaffirmed with an updated commitment package and duration extensions (e.g., extend non-integration in distribution, maintain brand/price differentials, protect/expand Dosu distribution coverage, remove exclusivities for 3 years, extend compliance, extend price-cap commitments, no Ak Maya acquisition, and a no-imports commitment for 3 years).
Ongoing monitoring reports submitted (2015–2021) showed compliance. ↩︎
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(CASE: Türkiye) How Economic Analysis Shaped the Turkish Competition Authority’s MediaMarkt–Teknosa–Vatan Decision
When the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) investigated MediaMarkt, Teknosa, and Vatan, the question wasn’t simply whether prices looked alike — it was whether those similarities meant coordination. To test that, in the decision dated (26.10.2023 and numbered 23-50/978-355) the Economic Analysis and Research Department (EAAD) was asked to take a hard look at the data.
EAAD’s role was to find out whether the price movements observed in the market reflected deliberate alignment or natural interaction in a concentrated, transparent retail environment. Its report became the most data-driven part of the file — and a model of how competition authorities use empirical work to inform enforcement.
How EAAD did it
EAAD conducted an extensive quantitative study, which it submitted to the file on 24 April 2023 (no. 63296). The analysis combined market data from both online channels (the retailers’ official websites) and physical stores located in shopping malls (AVMs), covering a broad enough range to capture real-world pricing behavior.
The scope was focused but representative:
- 10 products tracked online.
- 5 products observed across 10 shopping malls.
For products where preliminary findings suggested unusual synchronization, EAAD performed a deeper, hourly-based analysis using average prices across undertakings. This micro-level approach allowed the team to see not only if prices aligned, but how — and under what timing pattern.
The hourly data revealed a nuanced picture. Prices occasionally equalized, but the equalizations went in both directions — sometimes through price cuts, sometimes through price increases. There was no single trend and no leader–follower dynamic: no retailer systematically set prices first or dictated changes for others.
In some cases, two firms might raise prices while the third reduced them. At other times, one retailer kept its price stable while others changed theirs. These variations showed that pricing strategies were independent and responsive, not coordinated.
When EAAD compared price-change frequencies and timing patterns within a 60-day window, it found that the retailers usually adjusted prices at different hours or on different days. The number of changes and timing of updates also varied by firm — particularly with Vatan, which displayed noticeably distinct pricing behavior compared with MediaMarkt and Teknosa.
To understand what might explain those timing differences, the Authority followed up with the companies. Each was asked whether the “risk periods” identified in the analysis — those moments when prices aligned — were linked to any specific factors like promotions, campaign starts or ends, seasonal discounts, cost changes, or supply shortages.
In their responses, Vatan, Teknosa, and MediaMarkt all pointed to commercially rational explanations: campaign schedules, supplier costs, and independent marketing decisions. None acknowledged any mutual coordination, and the Authority found nothing to contradict that account.
EAAD then integrated this information into its assessment. While it acknowledged that, in some periods, the market data could resemble those seen in restricted-competition environments, it stressed that this resemblance was not supported by evidence of collusion. The combination of hourly pricing data and firms’ explanations for promotions or supply shocks made it clear that the patterns could not be tied to any anticompetitive understanding.
What EAAD actually found
Pulling all this together, EAAD concluded that:
- Prices occasionally moved in parallel, but both upward and downward, showing no single trend.
- There was no leader–follower structure among the three undertakings.
- Each firm displayed distinct timing in its price changes, with Vatan often behaving differently.
- Price alignments tended to occur at different hours or days, suggesting reaction rather than coordination.
- Once campaign effects and supply-side factors were accounted for, no collusive pattern remained.
What paragraph 93 revealed
The Board summarized EAAD’s findings and the legal standard in paragraph 93:
“The analysis indicates that during some periods, prices followed parallel paths and that market conditions similar to those observed in restricted-competition markets existed. However, given the market’s oligopolistic structure, it is necessary to distinguish whether such price movements stem from an anticompetitive agreement, from firms monitoring each other through publicly available information, or from other factors affecting prices. In the Board’s practice, price parallelism detected solely through economic evidence does not, by itself, amount to an infringement under Law No. 4054 unless supported by communication evidence. In this case, no document indicating that the undertakings communicated or exchanged information has been found.”
That sentence crystalizes the heart of the matter: economic parallelism is not enough. Without communication evidence, similar prices remain consistent with legitimate competitive observation in an oligopolistic market.
How that fed into the Board’s call
The Competition Board adopted EAAD’s balanced view. Within the evidence tested, it found no documents or communications demonstrating an infringement of Article 4 by MediaMarkt, Teknosa, or Vatan. Consequently, no fines were imposed.
EAAD’s nuanced portrait — occasional parallel movements, dynamic and competitive pricing, no leader–follower pattern, some “restricted-competition-like” conditions but no collusion proof — provided the analytical backbone of that outcome.
Why it matters
The case is a textbook example of how economic analysis can cool legal suspicion. In markets dominated by a few visible players, data can look suspiciously coordinated even when it’s just interdependent competition.
EAAD’s methodical, data-driven work helped the TCA avoid confusing market structure with concerted practice. It reaffirmed a core antitrust principle that matters everywhere from Brussels to Ankara:
Parallel ≠ collusion.
Economic evidence can show resemblance, but without communication, it doesn’t prove conspiracy — and that distinction keeps enforcement both fair and credible.
This post was written with analytical and editorial support from ChatGPT-5, using official sources from the Turkish Competition Authority’s decision (dated 26.10.2023 and numbered 23-50/978-355). All interpretations, however, reflect the author’s own understanding of the case and the role of economic analysis in competition enforcement.
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Recent Developments in Evidence-based Policy Making
In democracies, the elected governments have right to rule in accordance with their political agenda approved by the voters. Besides the governments use public funds to enforce their agenda. Therefore, efficient use of public funds is a critical point. Evidence-based policy making (EBPM) process is a good way to allocate public funds efficiently and increase the effectiveness of public interventions.
United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) are two leading countries in “evidence-based policy making”. In a recent article published in Voxeu discusses development in two sides of Atlantic. We try to summarize those developments in our blog.
Let’s start with US, Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016 was enacted in March 2016. It is important to mention that the Act was supported by both Republican and Democratic congress members. Under roof of the Act, Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking was founded. The fundamental mission of the Commission was to look for ways to improve use of the data for evidence-based purposes.
In Trump’s term, he tried to block efforts associated with EBPM. However, EBPM Commission was able to complete its studies and published its final report in September 2017 thanks to firm position of Congress in political system of US. That report led to Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018 that was enacted in January 2019. The Act foresees that every government agency needs to appoint a chief data officer, an evaluation officer and a statistical official to develop evidence-building plan. Furthermore, every government agency needs to submit annual evaluation plan. Specifically, the evaluation officer is expected to educate agencies’ management and staff about evaluation policy and process.
When we come to Biden’s term, he issued Memorandum on Restoring Trust in Government Through Scientific Integrity and Evidence-Based Policymaking to every government bodies. Moreover, Biden also emphasized the importance of evidence-based policy making by using science and data.
Let’s jump the east coast of Atlantic, EBPM efforts were begun with Blair’s governments, UK founded The Analysis Function, which is cross- network of economists, analytical professionals and statisticians working in government. The fundamental purpose of the Function is to share best practices, develop new methods and make effective cross functional analysis. In that sense, the number of economists in public agencies has grown rapidly under Blair’s rule. There were approximately 500 economists in 2000, the number was increased to around 1.300 in 2012. We see slowdown in growth rate in the period of 2012 – 2018 (due to austerity). After 2018 we see raising trend again.
The article mentions that evidence-based policymaking efforts do not have expected impact on both decision makers and voters. In that sense, the article points out Brexit Referendum in which although the Treasury and other relevant agencies had foreseen the negative impact, majority of voters has chosen to leave European Union.
In April 2021, Johnson government has established the Policy Evaluation Task Force (ETF) as continuance of EBPM efforts. Basic function of ETF is to provide support and spending departments under the Treasury on evidence underpinning departments’ spending proposals.
Türkiye also introduces some initiatives about efficient allocation of public sources. The most recent effort is new package about Public Savings and Efficiency to control public spending. Previously, the government has published the Guidance on Regulatory Impact Analysis for public agencies to control efficiency and effectiveness of policy choices. Although Türkiye does not have specific agency like US and UK do, those are beneficial initiatives in any case.
In conclusion, both US and UK try to make EBPM more effective through different units and task forces and maximize the use of data and science in decision making and policy designing. The basic purpose is to increase efficient use of public funds and effectiveness of policies.
Source: https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/evidence-based-policymaking-us-and-uk
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CASE (Greece): Decision 520/2011 concerning the salty snacks market in Greece
*This text is taken from the Hellenic Competition Commission’s (HCC) contribution to the OECD 2021 Roundtable “Economic analysis and evidence in abuse cases”
Decision 520/2011 concerning the salty snacks market in Greece
The case concerned two complaints alleging that the company Tasty SA had implemented a targeted policy on a systematic basis, seeking to exclude its competitors from the market by means of exclusivity and discrimination.
In the course of the ensuing investigation, the HCC gathered an extensive set of data from the dawn raid which took place at Tasty’s premises and from several information requests addressed to competitors and customers, with a view to establishing whether Tasty held a dominant position on the market and whether it had engaged in anti-competitive practices. Extensive economic analysis was also conducted for the purpose of defining the relevant product market, after the submission of economic reports and testimony by both Tasty and the complainant.
In particular, the quantitative tests performed and thoroughly discussed in the context of the market definition were a SSNIP test, critical loss analysis, price correlation analysis and cointegration analysis (see paras. 95-105 of the Decision). The HCC assessed the economic analyses brought forward by the company and, without however performing additional quantitative tests, dismissed them and adopted a narrower market definition.
The company under investigation also submitted an AEC test but the HCC dismissed it as irrelevant in the circumstances of the case (see paras. 317-324 of the Decision).
The Administrative Court of Athens, which heard the case on appeal (Decision 869/2013) upheld the HCC’s analysis.
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What if your judge knows economics?
As known, competition law stands at the intersection of law and economics and that makes competition law very unique, in fact, pure legal assessments and argumentation may not lead to accurate judgments in every competition law case. Therefore, the economic dynamics of the case need to be considered.
As a result of that feature of competition law, many jurisdictions have room for both lawyers and economists in the cases (like US and EU). Turkish Competition Authority has also started to discuss economic evidence and directly refers to economic analysis in its recent cases.
The court stage is the next step after the authorities’ assessments. So the court also needs to have the ability to understand the economic dynamics of the case before them. Otherwise, the courts may misjudge an authority decision backed by economics from a “pure” legal perspective. As expected, judges may not be able to understand all economic assumptions and explanations in the case in one hearing. Therefore, various jurisdictions look for methods that help judges assess the cases accurately and rule accordingly.
One of the leading economic consulting firms, Oxera, discusses those methods in different countries in its recent article. According to Oxera, there is a party-appointed expert system in United Kingdom. There are three rules in the system. First, experts have legal duty to help the court. Second, experts must argue with each other and prepare a joint document covering all issues agreed or disagreed. Lastly, if the case goes to trial, experts need to join the hearing and explain their position and arguments. Consequently, all economic and technical complexity of the case is narrowed, hence assessment becomes easier for judges.
Another method used in the courts is the “Expert Hot Tub”, in which a certain number of experts come together under the roof of the court, have discussions about the case, and answer questions. Thus, judges can make cross-examination and judges can grasp the economics of the case better. Oxera categorizes “Expert Hot Tub” types in its sharing. Those are the types:
– The Judge-in-Charge Model: One the methods used in the United Kingdom, in which the judge takes the lead and asks all relevant questions to the experts (option of cross-examination by parties’ attorney is very limited).
– The Continental Model: The Court appoints an expert for the case and the court arranges a hearing for the economists, in which both sides can share their arguments and comment on each other’s positions. At the end of the process, every piece of economic evidence is discussed and all sides equally understand the evidence.
– The Improvised Hot Tub: Another method used in the United Kingdom. In that method (Oxera talks about a patent case), the court asks questions to experts in the hot tub and the court is able to make cross examination.
– The Hybrid–Standard Model: For Oxera, it is the most common method. One expert begins with a hot tub and the judge is in the leading position and the judge asks questions. After that other experts take the floor and the cross-examination process starts. That method is complementary for both the court and the sides’ legal teams in understanding the key points.
– The Hybrid-Full Service Model: There are many experts in the hot tub (in It is 5 in Oxera’s example from New Zealand). The process may extend several days. During that time all economists are cross-examined and lawyers have also the right to ask questions. After that, the court asks its questions.
In conclusion, there are efforts in many jurisdictions to reduce the complexity of economics behind the competition law cases and enable judges to have accurate assessments and decisions. It is very beneficial since as mentioned above the courts are also part of competition law enforcement, it is essential to decide by knowing the economic dynamics of the case.
In Türkiye, it would be better for our court of appeal to start to focus on economics, as the Turkish Competition Authority has done. Turkish legal system also has expert mechanisms for technical issues. The implementation of that mechanism can be extended to the competition law enforcement as well.
Source: https://www.oxera.com/insights/agenda/articles/the-expert-hot-tub-choose-your-model/
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“Economic Analysis of Law” and Manne Effect
Today, we want to share and summarize an Economist article named “How Chicago school economists reshaped American justice” published in the Economist. You can find the general discussions and critical points below.
Fifty years ago, a federal judge, Richard Posner, published his article “Economic Analysis of Law”, the work was mostly inspired by a group of economists from Chicago school, some of those was Gary Becker, Ronald Coase and Milton Friedman. In this sense, the law and economics movement emerged and thanks to that movement, courts became more reasoned and rigorous. After its emergence, every legal action was questioned in the context of incentives of actors and the changes these produced. In his study (Crime and punishment: an economic approach) Becker stated that harsh sentences reduce the criminal activity just like high prices cut the demand.
Although the law and economist movement attracted little attention from the academia in that particular period of time. Posner’s book was the first driver of Law and Economics movement to become mainstream, while Manne Economics Institute for Federal Judges was regarded as the second driver behind popularity of Law and Economics movement. It is necessary to mention that Friedman and Paul Samuelson, both were Nobel Prize winners were among the designers of the course.
According to figures shared in the article, Manne course had huge impact on odds incarceration. The details can be seen in the graph.
Moreover, in a study published by Elliot Ash of ETH Zurich, Daniel Chen of Princeton University and Suresh Naidu of Columbia University in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, examined the impact and reached similar outputs shared in the graph above. In fact, authors focused on comparing the decision taken by Manne alumni before and after their participation in the programme. An AI based approach called “Word embedding” used to evaluate the language in judges’ approach and behavior. According to findings, federal judges, who attended to the course, were more likely to use words like efficiency and market, whereas the were less likely to use words like discharged or revoke. Similarly, Manne alumni tend to be more conservative on antitrust and other economic cases %30 more often in the cases after they participated in the course. Furthermore, %5 increase in prison sentences imposed and %25 increase in the length of the sentences were observed in judges’ cases after the course.
In conclusion, a group of academicians from Chicago school and judges affected by the school reshaped American justice. Although it has been 50 years since its emergence, the law and economics approach continues to be prominent in antitrust and economic cases.
The Source:
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(CASE: Türkiye) No fine for information exchange in cement industry. Structural break test used in defense.
In the Turkish Competition Authority’s decision dated 23.11.2022 and numbered 22-52/787-323, the allegation that 9 cement companies engaged in an anticompetitive information exchange was examined. Within the scope of the ex officio investigation, the Investigation Board concluded that Çimsa, Küpeliler, Başta, Konya Çimento and Göltaş had engaged in an exchange of information sensitive to competition in violation of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 and concluded that administrative fines should be imposed on the aforementioned companies. The Competition Board, on the other hand, decided not to impose a fine with a majority of votes by determining that no infringing information or documents were found in its analysis. Two members of the Board voted against this majority decision. These members made the following objections:
- The number of cement bags, daily-monthly-annual cement production-sales-availability and stock information are “competition sensitive” information.
- Communications between some cement producers on “price” and “price distortion” indicate inter-company coordination and anti-competitive collusion.
- Competition-sensitive information from one company is not explicitly rejected by the other company; on the contrary, the communication is continued.
- In the cement market, which is oligopolistic, geographically limited and homogeneous due to its structure, information exchange took place between competitors.
- In this context, the competition was restricted in terms of “purpose”.
For these reasons, the dissenting members emphasized that administrative fines should be imposed on the companies and therefore they disagreed with the decision.
One of the defendants (Çimsa) put forward its economic analysis which was explained in detail in the decision. In its economic analysis report, Çimsa argued that the nominal price trend for a selected product which is subject to cartel investigation was below the producer price index and the real price of that product was generally in a downward trend in the 2017-2020 period. In addition, Çimsa compared the prices of direct inputs (petroleum coke, lignite, electricity, natural gas, etc.) in cement products with the prices of cement products and emphasized that input prices showed much higher increases, relatively. In this framework, it was stated that there is no such phenomenon as “upward decoupling of prices from costs” for cement products.
The Çimsa Economic Analysis Report also presented an economic model to compare the periods before and after July-August 2020 for the comparison of the period subject to the cartel allegation. Accordingly, “packaged gray cement” products, which are the only overlapping products between Çimsa and Küpeliler -another party being investigated-, were taken into consideration, and average variable production cost (AVPC) and average production cost (APC) were analyzed. Accordingly, data from selected sales regions of Çimsa were analyzed. For the selected products, the econometric models between Price and Cost were found to be generally significant (the p-value in the F-test is close to zero) and the price changes could be explained by cost changes in a statistically significant way. The model also showed that the demand variable (the change in clinker stocks in the Central Anatolia Region and the change in clinker stocks at Çimsa-Eskişehir and Afyon plants) had a significant effect on cement prices. In the report, it was argued that this effect did not differ after the July 2020 period. As a result, it has been concluded that the sales price changes at Çimsa-Eskişehir and Afyon plants could be explained with reasonable, economic and rational justifications and that there is no a specific effect for the period after July 2020.In addition to all these, the OLS-CUSUM (Ordinary Least Square Based Cumulative Sum) Structural Break Test -used by the Competition Board in the 2021 Wheat Flour and 2020 Fertilizer decisions- was utilized by Çimsa and it was emphasized that as a result of this test there was no finding of “(an) indication that there may be an unusualness (cartel) in the market in question” and finally, it was concluded that the economic analysis did not support the appearance of a cartelistic structure.
The Competition Board, on the other hand, did not make a direct assessment of these defenses, since no infringement had already been found against Çimsa.
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“Are excessive pricing cases few and far between? A quantitative analysis of fifty years of European jurisprudence 1971–2021”, by Behrang Kianzad, 2023
Behrang Kianzad, Are excessive pricing cases few and far between? A quantitative analysis of fifty years of European jurisprudence 1971–2021, September 2023, Concurrences N° 3-2023, Art. N° 113222, http://www.concurrences.com
This article examines the prevalence and historical context of excessive pricing cases within European competition law. It commences by tracing the roots of excessive pricing regulations back to ancient legal systems, highlighting that these prohibitions are deeply entrenched in legal history.
Despite their long history, excessive pricing cases often raise eyebrows in contemporary competition law discussions. Many consider them “controversial” and “unconventional,” suggesting that they should be used sparingly. However, this article aims to debunk the notion that such cases are rare by presenting quantitative evidence.
The crux of the article lies in its quantitative analysis, which spans five decades, from 1971 to 2021. It uncovers a total of 28 cases handled at the European level, including the European Commission, General Court, and Court of Justice, alongside an additional 99 cases at the national level across various European Member States.
The article delves into the legal framework surrounding excessive pricing, notably referencing the “Cost Plus” test established in the United Brands case. This test evaluates excessive pricing by comparing prices to the economic value of products, emphasizing a reasonable profit margin.
Economically, there’s a debate about the necessity of excessive pricing regulations, with varying opinions ranging from outright denial of their existence to strong advocacy for their enforcement as a core aspect of competition law.
Interestingly, the article notes an increasing trend in excessive pricing cases across the European Union, challenging the perception that competition authorities are reluctant to address them.
Beyond the European level, the article explores cases handled by national competition authorities, acknowledging the complexities stemming from differing national laws and practices. It also highlights the diversity of sectors involved in these cases, ranging from transportation to copyright royalties.
In conclusion, this article dispels the belief that excessive pricing cases are infrequent. It presents a comprehensive analysis of the legal, economic, and historical aspects of these cases within European competition law, demonstrating that they are more prevalent and actively pursued than commonly believed.
At the end of the article, Kienzad gives a comprehensive list of excessive price cases of EU and NCAs, which would be quite meaningful for any interested in excessive price cases in antitrust practice.
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THE GLOBAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS CONFERENCE (16th Nov. 2023, New York, NYU Stern / concurrences.com
THE DETAILS AND REGISTRATION:
https://events.concurrences.com/en/evenement/the-global-antitrust-economics-conference-222-en
PROGRAM
Registration & Breakfast
8:30
WELCOME REMARKS
9.00
Luis CABRAL | Chair, Department of Economics, NYU Stern School of Business, New York (bio)
FIRESIDE CHAT: WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED FROM THE FTC/DOJ MERGER GUIDELINES?
09.05
Elinor HOFFMANN | Chief, Antitrust Bureau at Office of the New York Attorney General, NY*
Moderator: Lawrence WHITE | Professor, Department of Economics, NYU Stern School of Business, New York (bio)
#1 FINANCIAL SERVICES IN ANTITRUST
9.45
The panel will explore the question of whether antitrust policy should be involved in combating inflation and assess the role of antitrust in the financial services sector as Big tech companies enter the market. Additionally, it will address the impact of new financial regulations on competition, the issue of consolidation in the banking and stock exchange industries, and the need for more aggressive enforcement of private equity acquisitions. Furthermore, it will highlight the antitrust challenges in creating a legal framework for the cryptocurrency exchange market and the African Exchanges Linkage Project (AELP), which aims to interconnect stock exchanges in Africa.
Maggie GOODLANDER | Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Washington, D.C*
Patrizia MARTINO | Senior Counsel, TD Bank Group, Toronto (bio)
Andrea MARVAN SALTIEL | Chairperson, COFECE, Mexico*
Celeste SARAVIA | Vice President, Cornerstone Research, San Francisco (bio)Moderator: Bill BAER | Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. (bio)
COFFEE BREAK
11.15
#2 ANTITRUST IN LIFE SCIENCES
11.45
The panel touches upon various aspects related to antitrust and competition in the health and life sciences industries. It highlights recent mergers in this sector, such as Illumina’s acquisition of Grail and Seagen’s merger with Pfizer. Furthermore, the panel mentions the increased antitrust scrutiny of information exchanges and collaborations within the health care industry, as evidenced by the Department of Justice’s withdrawal of three antitrust guidance documents and the Federal Trade Commission’s investigations on Pharmacy Benefit Managers. Additionally, the discussion will point out instances of price and non-price abuses. Lastly, the importance of patent litigation in the health and life sciences industries will be underlined.
Aileen FAIR | Senior Corporate Counsel Litigation & Government Investigations, Antitrust & Competition Law, Bristol Myers Squibb, Washington D.C. (bio)
Pauline KENNEDY | Antitrust & Competition Practice Principal, Bates White, Washington D.C. (bio)
Stephen MOHR | Assistant Director, Mergers I, U.S Federal Trade Commission, Washington D.C. (bio)Moderator: TBD
LUNCH
13.15
#3 THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST CASES
14.30
The panel provides an overview of recent criminal antitrust cases where economists testified, including United States v. Lischewski (2019) on price-fixing, and United States v. DaVita (2022), which dealt with a no-poach agreement. It highlights the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) Antitrust Division’s renewed focus on using Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act to prosecute monopolization cases for the first time in over 40 years. The discussion will also focus on US Labor monopsony issues. This comprehensive look at recent antitrust cases and enforcement actions underscores the growing importance of addressing anticompetitive practices to protect fair competition and workers’ rights in various industries.
Sean FARRELL | Chief, New York Office, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, New York
Diana L. MOSS | Vice President and Director of Competition Policy, Progressive Policy Institute, Washington D.C. (bio)
Jesús M. ALVARADO-RIVERA | Global Director Antitrust, Anheuser-Busch InBev, Washington D.C.*Moderator: TBD
COFFEE BREAK
16.00
#4 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: HOW TO REGULATE ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES?
16.30
The panel addresses the concerning issue of algorithmic collusion that can lead to anticompetitive practices. It also highlights the significance of data collection and privacy concerns in this context. The mention of the Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2022 indicates growing regulatory attention to hold companies accountable for the algorithms they employ.
Ioana E. MARINESCU | Division’s principal Economist, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C. (bio)
Moderator: Daniel FRANCIS | Professor of Law, NYU School of Law, New York (bio)
*To be confirmed
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Economic Evidence on Non-compete Agreements
Gabriella Monahova and Kate Foreman published an article about economic evidence on noncompete agreements in labor markets. In our column, we try to summarize the outputs of that article.
In the article, the authors divided the study into some parts; (i) theoretical framework (pros and cons), (ii) empirical evidence (employment, firms, and impact), and (iii) general discussions.When we look at the theoretical benefits of the practice, the report prepared by US Treasury states some benefits. Firstly, firms can protect their trade secrets like intellectual property rights that improve the effectiveness of employees by adding noncompete clauses in their agreements. A lack of such terms may lead to a decline in effectiveness since employers may refrain from sharing trade secrets with their employees. Secondly, there might be a motivation for employers to invest more in training employees to reduce employees’ churn. On the other side, a lack of non-compete terms may reduce investment done by employers to employees. Finally, non-compete terms may lead to higher wages for employees in return of higher effectiveness and reduced capability of switching jobs.
On the costs side, the same report states some topics too. In general, the report expresses that non-compete agreements may decrease workers’ leverage in wage negotiations, force workers to leave the industry in which they are skilled and lead to a decline in overall experience and knowledge, decrease productivity by reducing labor market liquidity, prevent competitors from offering better terms to skilled employees. In detail, the report states more issues. Firstly, some employees are able to be skeptical about noncompete agreements and negotiate with employers whereas some employees (especially the low waged ones) may not have such a chance. In addition, firms founded by ex-employees of established firms can be prevented as a result of non-compete agreements, and founding new firms and enhancing competition may become more difficult Secondly, knowledge dissemination based on the transfer of employees may have good outputs on consumers since thanks to those employees, the competitors may make up new or low-cost products based on the same knowledge and skill. Finally, non-compete terms may force employees to stay at their current exploitative employers.
The authors examined some empirical studies in the following section of the article. Accordingly, there are studies about the outcomes of both employees and firms. The studies use enforceability of noncompete agreements across states in the US and over time, the method used in those studies is generally difference in difference models. In the employees’ side, studies generally focus on wages and worker mobility. For example, in research about the impact of the noncompete ban on the Hawaii technology market, researchers reached that the ban on noncompete agreements led to an increase in employee mobility by %11 and an increase in new-hired wages by %4. Another paper evaluates the impact of noncompete enforceability on wages and training. The researcher concludes that there is a positive relation between noncompete agreement enforceability and training (%14 increase) while there is a negative relation between noncompete agreement enforceability and hourly wages (%4 decreases). The study also states that wage decrease is higher for less skilled laborers.
When we come to firms’ side impact, we see positive relation between the existence of noncompete terms and an increase in investments. In a research, firms in states where non-compete terms are legally accepted have a greater appetite to have riskier investments than the firms have in states where non-compete terms are not accepted. In another study based on Linkedin data employment historical data, the researcher found that the stronger existence of noncompete terms not only leads to a decrease in employee leaving and entrepreneurship but also an increase in investments in existing firms 2 million $ on average.
In conclusion, the authors state that much study is needed to give an answer to the question of “are noncompete agreements overall beneficial or harmful”. The authors think that the claim of “noncompete agreements encourage capital and R&D investments” is based on strong theoretical and empirical arguments. On the other side, they see strong evidence that noncompete agreements lead to decreased worker mobility, limit entrepreneurship, and have more negative impacts on women and less educated workers and those with less bargaining power.
As economics.legal, we think that the need for economic studies to examine theoretical and legal arguments is growing. Economic evidence and economic analyses will become more vital in discussions in both competition law and the general policy-making process. The article that we examined above also shows that all stakeholders of a new and hot debate topic require empirical economic evidence to prevail.